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This paper reviews the empirical and theoretical 
literature on economic growth to examine how the 
four components of the climate change bill, namely 
mitigation, proactive (ex ante) adaptation, reactive 
(ex post) adaptation, and ultimate damages of climate 
change affect growth, especially in developing countries. 
The authors consider successively the Cass-Koopmans 
growth model and three major strands of the subsequent 
literature on growth: with multiple sectors, with 
rigidities, and with increasing returns. The paper finds 
that although the growth literature rarely addresses 
climate change per se, some issues discussed in the 
growth literature are directly relevant for climate change 
analysis. Notably, destruction of production factors, or 
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decrease in factor productivity may strongly affect long-
run equilibrium growth even in one-sector neoclassical 
growth models; climatic shocks have had large impacts on 
growth in developing countries because of rigidities; and 
the introducing increasing returns has a major impact 
on growth dynamics, in particular through induced 
technical change, poverty traps, or lock-ins. Among the 
most important gaps identified in the literature are lack 
of understanding of the channels by which shocks affect 
economic growth, lack of understanding of lock-ins, 
heavy reliance of numerical models assessing climate 
policies on neoclassical-type growth frameworks, and 
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1.  Introduction 
Climate change specialists are alarmed by the acceleration in greenhouse gases emissions 
associated with the current fossil-fuel dependent economic growth rates, and they recommend 
strong mitigation action. However, many countries see the need for continued growth now and 
worry that economic growth will be harmed if they engage in mitigation. 
Yet in the absence of any action, climate change will generate damages that will also alter 
country growth trajectories relative to the case without climate change, possibly even more so 
than if mitigation measures were adopted. Even when coping behaviors are factored in (‘reactive 
adaptation’), the remaining damages of climate change (i.e., technically or economically 
irreversible consequences for welfare) may still be very large. Early actions to adapt to a world 
with a different climate (‘anticipative adaptation’)—of increasing importance as mitigation is 
delayed due to collective action problems—may of course reduce potential damages further, but 
they may also impose a toll on economic growth. Thus all types of action (including ‘no action’) 
will imply a set of costs. 
The problem that policymakers face is thus to compare the implications for economic growth 
of several policy trajectories with more (or less) action ex ante, in the form of mitigation and 
proactive adaptation, and thus less (or more) levels of reactive adaptation and damages ex post; 
with a view to finding a portfolio of policy actions that minimizes the impact of the climate 
change bill—mitigation, proactive adaptation, reactive adaptation and ultimate damages—on 
economic growth. 
In the present paper, we take one step towards achieving this goal by examining how 
individual components of the climate change bill affect growth, and what are the channels by 
which they do so. Comparing how policy trajectories that include all four components of the 
climate bill affect growth, let alone finding the optimal mix between mitigation, proactive 
adaptation, reactive adaptation and residual damages is beyond the scope of the present paper 
(Lecocq and Shalizi, 2007, discuss the latter problem from a resource allocation point of view). 
  2The literature on the economic modeling of climate change has addressed only subsets of these 
issues. Most climate change models estimate the cost of mitigation
1 in a partial equilibrium or 
static general equilibrium framework (see e.g., Weyant et al., 1999 for a review). As such, they 
do not analyze the consequences of mitigation for growth. A few papers use growth models (e.g., 
Nordhaus, 1993) and analyze the consequences of mitigation for growth, but they do not examine 
how the structure of the underlying growth model constrains the results. In addition, since the 
impacts of climate change are uncertain and difficult to model, most climate change models 
analyze the problem in a cost-efficiency framework, and hence do not explicitly model damages 
(e.g., McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1999, Paltsev et al., 2005). A few climate change models analyze 
the problem in a cost-benefit framework and explicitly model damages (e.g., Manne and Richels, 
1992), but they usually rely on simplified growth models that are insufficient to address the 
complexity of the relationship between impacts of climate change and economic growth that 
would be of interest to policymakers.  
The theoretical and empirical literature on economic growth addresses many issues that are 
directly relevant to the climate change problem, such as the relationship between climatic shocks 
and economic growth. But it rarely discusses climate change explicitly. One exception is Tol and 
Fankhauser (2005), who consider the ‘ultimate impacts’ of climate change on growth (but not the 
consequences of mitigation and adaptation measures) within a one-sector framework.  
The objective of this paper is to briefly review the theoretical and empirical literature on 
economic growth in order to qualitatively assess the consequences for growth of the different 
components of the climate change bill (defined in section 2.1). Our approach is similar to Tol and 
Fankhauser’s, but we extend their analysis in two directions: first by taking all components of the 
climate change bill into account, and second by reviewing the implications of a wider range of 
theoretical and empirical results about economic growth. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by detailing the different 
components of the climate bill and discussing briefly how the channels by which they affect 
growth might differ. On this basis, section 3 discusses the implications of climate change for 
economic growth within the theoretical framework of the Cass-Koopmans (CK) growth model. 
                                                      
1 The cost of mitigation is “the total value that society places on the goods and services forgone as a result of the 
diversion of resources to climate protection” (Markandya et al., 2001, p.459). In theory, net costs should be 
computed, taking into account avoided damages of climate change. In general, however, ‘mitigation costs’ refers to 
gross costs, that is without taking avoided damages into account. In cost-benefit settings, benefits of mitigation are 
usually reported separately. 
  3We start with the CK model because it is the simplest analytical framework with normative 
content within which the discussion can take place, and because it underpins a large number of 
the numerical models where the consequences of mitigation (or of ultimate damages) on growth 
are discussed. The CK model, however, does not adequately capture key stylized facts about 
growth, particularly in developing countries (section 4). Though no single model to date fully 
overcomes this limitation, the growth literature has seen major developments since the CK 
model. Here we review how the components of the climate change bill affect economic growth in 
three major strands of the recent literature: models that ‘open the black box’ and consider 
economies with multiple sectors and regions (Section 5), models that take rigidities into account 
to better capture transitional growth processes (Section 6), and models that allow for increasing 
returns to scale (Section 7). The final section summarizes key findings from the review and draws 
implications for the literature on growth, for numerical modeling of climate change, and for 
policy.  
2.  Setting the stage: An informal framework for analyzing the impacts of climate change 
on economic growth 
2.1.  The four components of the climate change bill 
The causal chain linking economic behavior today to economic consequences tomorrow via 
climate change can be summarized as follows: economic activities Æ emissions Æ 
concentrations Æ climate change Æ impacts on (ultimate damages to) physical and ecological 
systems and, finally Æ impacts on (ultimate damages to) economies. In this paper, mitigation 
consists of reducing emissions (or removing greenhouse gases (GHGs) out of the atmosphere) at 
the beginning of the chain to avoid or minimize climate change in the first place, whereas 
adaptation consists of responding to economic damages of climate change at the end of the 
chain. 
In addition, two forms of adaptation are distinguished. Reactive adaptation focuses on 
‘coping’ with the adverse impacts of climate change ex post, when they occur. Anticipative 
adaptation (or proactive adaptation) focuses on lowering the costs of coping ex ante. It 
encompasses measures taken in advance to limit the ultimate damages of climate change and/or 
to reduce the extent of reactive adaptation required when climate-change associated events and 
  4trends materialize.
2 In this paper we use the term ‘ultimate damages’ for those damages that 
would be incurred in the absence of any policies, and ‘remaining ultimate damages’ for those 
damages that are technically or economically irreversible, and likely to remain after all mitigation 
and adaptation expenditures have been incurred. 
Thus, the additional effort on economies imposed by the presence of climate change has four 
components: (i) mitigation efforts (M), (ii) anticipative or proactive adaptation efforts (P), (iii) 
coping or reactive adaptation efforts (R), and (iv) the ultimate damages/remaining ultimate 
damages (UD/RUD) of climate change on the economies—the level of which depends of course 
on the level of mitigation, as well as, on the level of proactive and reactive adaptation.
3  
Mitigation, proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation are policy variables, whereas 
remaining ultimate damages/ultimate damages are impacts that remain after adopting policies 
(mitigation, proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation) or in the absence of adopting any 
policies respectively. 
2.2.  The different components of the climate bill will have different consequences for 
growth 
The most obvious difference between the components of the climate change bill is in timing: 
ultimate damages and reactive adaptation expenditures are incurred at the time damages occur, 
whereas proactive adaptation and mitigation expenditures are incurred before damages occur. As 
a result, the components of the climate bill are likely to differ by the degree of concentration of 
efforts in time.
4 Ultimate impacts of climate change and reactive adaptation expenditures may be 
inescapably concentrated in time (and possibly repeated), for example when an extreme weather 
event occurs. On the other hand, it is possible to distribute proactive adaptation and mitigation 
                                                      
2 For repeated events, the reaction of societies may change over time. The first time a crisis occurs, economic agents 
(societies/households/firms) will spend to cope ex-post within their ability to pay (i.e. reactive adaptation), but if 
repeated crisis are expected, the same agents might adopt anticipative adaptation ex-ante.  
3 The ultimate impacts of climate change on economies may sometimes be positive (for some regions and sectors), at 
least within a tolerable range of climate change. For example, agriculture in temperate and boreal zones is expected 
to benefit from climate change for mean temperature increase below 3°C relative to the current level (Adger et al., 
2007). However, because of uncertainties much of the focus of climate change analysis is on the risks—i.e. the net 
adverse consequences/damages—accompanying climate change. 
4 Differences in timing also point to two key issues in the comparison across policy trajectories. One is the value of 
the discount rate. The second is uncertainty, which is highest when action is undertaken early. 
  5efforts over longer periods of time.
5 Whether efforts are concentrated in time or not has 
implications for growth because rapid transitions are more difficult to adjust to. 
The second main difference between components of the climate bill is in nature: the ultimate 
damages of climate change result from physical changes in the environment within which the 
economy operates; whereas mitigation, proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation are policy 
measures aimed at modifying households and firms behaviors, but from within the economic 
system. The consequences for growth will be different in each case.  
The ultimate impacts of climate change are likely to affect factors of production and their 
productivity directly. For example, climate damages may reduce capital stock—e.g., cyclone 
destroying factories, farms and houses—, reduce the productivity of capital—e.g., floods 
reducing the number of days during which factories can produce or the number of months during 
which a road network is usable—, or reduce the growth rate of factors of production—e.g., 
climate-change related spread of malaria increasing infant mortality rate or leading to additional 
out-migration from malaria infected regions. Thus, the ultimate damages of climate change may 
directly affect the level (and the growth rate) of productivity in climate-sensitive sectors—e.g., 
increases in temperature eroding agricultural productivity, and indirectly in sectors that may not 
appear at first glance to be climate sensitive such as, manufacturing or services. 
On the other hand, reactive adaptation, anticipative adaptation and mitigation, are likely to 
translate into additional expenditures to avoid or minimize changes in the stock, productivity or 
growth rate of production factors, or to avoid or minimize changes in production functions. 
Additional expenditures might be needed to strengthen infrastructure—for example, to erect a 
dyke and protect a farm, a factory or a building from sea-surges and keep capital stock intact and 
productive, or to strengthen institutions—for example, by enforcing zoning measures to avoid 
occupation of a flood plain. 
The distinctions made above are not absolute, as all four components of the climate bill are 
likely to encompass both concentrated and gradual efforts,
6 and to affect growth via both 
                                                      
5 Unless of course repeated delays in starting action make gradual increases in mitigation and proactive adaptation 
impracticable. 
6 The ultimate damages of climate change might span over long periods of time (e.g., gradual increase in 
temperature), whereas mitigation or proactive adaptation, as noted in the footnote 5, might require large efforts over 
short periods of time to be effective. 
  6expenditures and direct influence on factors of production or production functions
7—but with 
different proportions. Yet the distinctions made above provide a useful guide to reviewing the 
literature: How do growth models respond when factors are affected by ultimate damages? And 
how do they respond when additional expenditures are incurred to minimize ultimate damages? 
What are the implications of gradual efforts for short-term and long-term growth? And what are 
the implications of shocks? 
2.3.  Evaluating the consequences of each component of the climate bill for growth 
An important methodological point about the appropriate counterfactual must be made here. 
Initially, when climate change emerged as a policy concern, the focus was on mitigation. But 
since damages were uncertain, most assessments of mitigation policies adopted a cost-efficiency 
framework in lieu of a cost-benefit framework. Unfortunately, without an appropriate 
counterfactual, the baseline used for comparison was usually business-as-usual growth (BAU) in 
the absence of climate change. This made it seem as if all policy actions (mitigation, proactive 
adaptation and reactive adaptation) would be more costly than the laisser faire / BAU (scenario 
S1 in Figure 1).  
However, as mentioned in the introduction, what matters ultimately for policy decisions is the 
relative impacts on growth of different policy trajectories, where more (less) action is taken and 
less (more) damage and reactive adaptation is incurred. In the presence of impending climate 
change, the appropriate counterfactual laisser faire scenario is one in which no action whatsoever 
is taken against climate change; and in which, as a result, the full set of damages associated with 
climate change are incurred on the whole portfolio of assets (S2). Unless the expected costs of 
mitigation and adaptation are very high relative to expected damages, it is possible to reduce the 
total climate bill by adding some degree of reactive adaptation (S3), and that it is possible to 
reduce the total climate bill further by adding well-selected combinations of anticipative 
measures (proactive adaptation and mitigation) (S4). In other words, an optimal policy 
combination of mitigation, proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation, should both reduce the 
remaining ultimate damages of climate change and the total climate bill relative to the laisser 
faire BAU scenario in the presence of climate change (S2). Our assumptions about growth rates g 
                                                      
7 For example, the ultimate impacts of climate change may also induce additional expenditures affecting growth such 
as costs of relocation. Similarly, mitigation or proactive adaptation may directly affect productivity if, e.g., proactive 
  7and per capita outputs y in scenarios (S1) to (S4) are summed up in Table 1. These relationships 
also underlie the relative positions of the aggregate output curves on Figure 1. 
 
Table 1: Assumptions regarding relative economic performance under scenarios S1 to S4 
representing scenarios with vs. without climate change (CC) and the absence vs. presence of 
policy actions for mitigation (M), proactive adaptation (PA), and reactive adaptation (RA). g 
refers to growth rate of per capita GDP in the transition (subscript T) or in the steady-state and y 
to the associated level of per capita GDP 
Scenario  Damages 
Transition to steady-state 
growth path 
Steady-state growth path 
    Growth rate 
of output 
Level of per 
capita output
Growth rate of 
output 
Level of per 
capita output
S1. BAU w/o climate change  no UD  gT (gT > g)  yT  <  y  g > gCC y > yCC
S2. BAU w/climate change  w/UD  gT2 >=< gT yT2 >=<yT gCC yCC
S3. w/CC: RA+RUD3 RUD3<UD  gT3 >=< gT2 yT3>=<yT2 g3 > gCC y3 > yCC
S4.w/CC: M+PA+RA+RUD4 RUD4<RUD3 gT4 >=< gT3 yT4>=<yT3 g4 > g3 y4 > y3
 
As a result, policy action—if correctly chosen—will bring a benefit relative to the laisser faire 
scenario where full damages are incurred (S3 and S4 versus S2). This point may seem trivial, but 
is important because climate change models often lack an explicit representation of damages and 
thus compute gross costs of mitigation (i.e., without taking avoided damages into account), as if 
climate policies were imposed on a World in which climate change does not exist.
8 Relative to 
this BAU scenario, policy action will always result in a high cost, but this reference case (S1) 
does not relate to any real-world situation anymore, since climate change is occurring. In theory, 
for the purpose of comparing the (net) costs of climate policies, it should not matter whether net 
costs are computed directly, or whether gross costs are compared with gross benefits. Yet in 
practice, the message conveyed is different when negative (net) costs or when positive (gross) 
costs are reported—even when it is explicitly stated that the latter do not include avoided 
                                                                                                                                                                            
adaptation leads to the adoption of new crops that are more capital-intensive to produce. 
  8damages.
9 In addition, and more importantly, there is a priori no reason why the implications of 
mitigation (and proactive adaptation) and the implications of remaining ultimate damages (and 
reactive adaptation) for economic growth should be separable. For example, the prospects for 
hydro energy, avoided deforestation or biological sequestration through plantations are very 
different in a world with climate change and in a world without it. Uncertainties on damages 
explain why gross costs are often used instead of net costs, but it must be made clear that the 
‘costs’ of policy action on growth that are then reported are (i) not sufficient to choose the best 
portfolio of policy actions if they are not also complemented with an estimate of avoided impacts 
of climate change on economic growth, and (ii) that even this comparison is probably not a good 
proxy for the combined effects of all policy actions and remaining ultimate damages on growth, 
since it overlooks the linkages between damages and policy actions.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
8 For example, all but one of the thirteen models in Weyant (1999) report gross costs of mitigation only. When the 
projection period was only 10-20 yrs into the future—at a time when the current effects of climate change were not 
measurable—this approach may have been acceptable. But even then, it was not appropriate for projection periods of 
50-100 yrs into the future. However, today with the growing evidence that climate change is already underway and 
causing damages, the policy debate relying on a comparison of the gross costs of different strategies is not tenable. 
9 Mohr (1995) discusses the importance of how the results of climate change policies are framed. 
  9Figure 1: Growth over time in the laisser faire BAU cases w/o CC [S1] and w/ CC [S2], with 
reactive adaptation only [S3], and with the full portfolio of action (reactive adaptation, 
anticipative adaptation and mitigation) [S4]  
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3.  Implications of climate change for economic growth within a Cass-Koopmans optimal 
growth model 
The one-sector Cass-Koopmans optimal growth model is the simplest analytical framework to 
generate insights into how climate change affects the growth process. It also provides the 
foundation for a wide range of numerical models attempting to compare the costs and benefits of 
climate mitigation (e.g., Manne and Richels, 1992; Nordhaus, 1993).  
3.1.  A short presentation of the Cass-Koopmans model 
The Cass-Koopmans model (Cass, 1965, Koopmans, 1965) combines the Ramsey approach of 
intertemporal welfare maximization (Ramsey, 1928) with the Solow-Swan (or neoclassical) 
production function and factor dynamics (Solow, 1956, Swan, 1956) to describe the optimal 
economic growth path in a one-sector closed economy. A discrete-time version of the model is 
  10provided here. Let t denote time periods. Let Kt and Lt be capital stock and labor stock at period t, 
and let Yt = At F(Kt,Lt) be the aggregate output with At total factor productivity. A key assumption 
of the neoclassical Solow-Swan production function F(.,.) is that each factor has decreasing 
returns when the other is held constant. Output is divided between consumption C and investment 
I (Eq.1). Investment increases the stock of capital at the next period, while capital depreciation 
(η) reduces it (Eq.2). Labor stock grows at an exogenous rate g (Eq.3).  
 
Yt = At F(Kt,Lt) = Ct + It         ( 1 )  
 
Kt+1 = (1-η)Kt + It        ( 2 )  
 
Lt+1 = Lt (1+g)
t        ( 3 )  
 
Because the economy in the model is a closed economy without a public sector, investment is 
assumed equal to savings. Because the marginal productivity of capital stock (Kt) tends to zero 
for a fixed size labor force (Lt) , growth in an economy modeled by (1-3) can be sustained in the 
long run only if the labor force grows (i.e., only if the exogenous rate of growth of labor g is 
strictly positive)—absent technical change. In this case, Solow and Swan show that when the rate 
of savings (s)—i.e., the investment to output ratio It/Yt is held constant, the economy converges 
towards a steady-state growth path in which aggregate output, aggregate consumption, and 
aggregate capital stock all grow at the same rate as the labor force—in other words, in which (k) 
the capital to labor (capital per worker) and (c) the consumption to labor (consumption per 
worker)
10 ratios are constant. The only possibility for consumption to labor to keep growing in 
the long run is if exogenous technical change is assumed (see below).
11
Cass and Koopmans examine model (1-3) from the perspective of a social planner who 
maximizes an intertemporal welfare maximization W—assumed utilitarian (Eq.4, with U the 
                                                      
10 Consumption per worker and consumption per capita (as a proxy for individual welfare) will be equal if the labor 
force is equal to the population. Otherwise, consumption per capita will be a fraction of the consumption per worker, 
with the fraction being defined as the ratio of the labor force to the population.. 
11 Exogenous technical change is also the only solution for aggregate output to grow in the long run when labor 
stabilizes or declines. In fact, demographic history suggests that population (and thus labor) grows significantly only 
in the transition between high-birthrate, high-mortality and low-birthrate, low-mortality states—because the decline 
in birthrate usually lags the decline in mortality. When the transition is completed, population tends to stabilize. 
  11individual utility functions at each generation—assumed identical—, and δ the pure rate of time 
preference). 
 
 Max {Ct} W = ∑
∞






       ( 4 )  
 
The rationale for looking at optimal growth instead of studying the dynamics of model (1-3) 
with ad hoc savings rule is twofold. First, from an analytical point of view, it allows one to 
understand how climate change affects the best (i.e., welfare-maximizing) achievable growth 
path. Second, optimal growth theory provides normative insights on how savings should be 
adjusted to maximize welfare when climate change is taken into account. This is consistent with 
the ultimate goal of the research within which this paper takes place, i.e. to provide policy 
insights for adjusting development strategies in the context of the emerging risk of climate 
change. However, strong assumptions are required about the welfare function. Since the 
construction of a welfare function is fraught with uncertainties and controversies, for example on 
the value of the pure rate of time preference, we try and distinguish between the results presented 
below which depend on the welfare function and those that do not.
12
In the Cass-Koopmans model, regardless of the initial capital and labor endowments, optimal 
investment (i.e. optimal savings) decisions make the economy converge
13 towards a unique 
optimal (i.e., welfare maximizing) steady-state growth path where aggregate output, aggregate 
capital and aggregate consumption all grow at the same rate as labor g—and thus where capital to 
labor and consumption to labor ratios are constant.
14 It is only in the transition path from the 
initial to the optimal capital to labor ratio aggregate output grows at a faster rate than the rate of 
growth of labor. In the steady-state growth path, aggregate output grows at the same rate as the 
labor force. If the labor force grows at the same rate as population—i.e., if g is the rate of 
population growth—then aggregate output per capita is stable in the steady-state growth path. But 
if labor force grows at a faster rate than population because of changes in participation rates— 
i.e., proportion of the population that is working—i.e., if g is higher than the rate of growth of 
                                                      
12 In the CK model, as in the other models, we examine here, the planner is assumed to have perfect foresight about 
the future (or about the distribution of possible futures when uncertainty is introduced). We do not build in actors and 
individuals’ expectations. But this could be a direction for future work. 
13 This property is the basis for subsequent analysis of convergence between economies within and across countries.  
14 The same steady-state already exists in the Solow-Swan model. 
  12population—then aggregate output per capita will continue to grow in the steady-state growth 
path. A key property of the Cass-Koopmans model is that the optimal savings rate automatically 
adjusts to compensate for positive or negative shocks, steering the economy back towards the 
optimal steady-state growth path. 
Along the optimal steady-state growth path without technical change, the levels of the capital 
to labor and consumption to labor ratios vary depending on structural characteristics of the 
economy. For example, if the production function F is Cobb-Douglas Y = A K
α L
1-α with α the 
elasticity of output with respect to capital and At is constant, and if the utility function is 
logarithmic, the steady-state saving rate s (Eq.5), the steady-state capital to labor ratio k (Eq.6) 
and the steady-state consumption to labor ratio c (Eq.7) are entirely characterized by parameters 
(α, g, η, δ, A), as follows:
15
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       ( 6 )
 
 
  c = A k
α (1-s)          ( 7 )
 
 
Technical change can be introduced in the CK model in three ways: as increasing labor 
productivity only (Harrod neutrality), capital productivity only (Solow neutrality) or as increasing 
total factor productivity (Hicks neutrality). In the general case, only CK models with Harrod-
neutral autonomous technical change exhibit a steady-state growth path (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
2003), while models with Solow- or Hicks-neutral autonomous technical change do not. When 
the production function is assumed Cobb-Douglas, however, all three forms of autonomous 
technical change are equivalent. Let us, for example, assume Harrod-neutral Cobb-Douglas such 
that the productivity of labor stock increases at a rate h. The model with Harrod-neutral technical 
change can be solved as the model (1)-(3) by using a measure of labor in efficiency units 
                                                      
15 See, e.g., Lecocq (2000), Chapter 5 for a demonstration of these classic results.  
  13(L = L(1+h)
t) instead of a measure of labor in number of working days. In the equivalents of 
equations (5)-(7), where g is replaced with g+h, it is now the ratios between capital and labor 
measured in efficiency unit K/L and the ratios between consumption and labor measured in 
efficiency units C/L that are constant. On the other hand, the capital to labor stock  and the 
consumption to labor stock ratios k and c are no longer constant with technical change, they are 
growing at rate h along the steady-state growth path.  
We now analyze how the components of the climate change bill affect growth via the two 
main routes identified in section 2.3 above, namely factors of production (in section 3.2) and 
additional expenditures (in section 3.3). When the quality of the environment is added to 
consumption as a determinant of individual utility, the Cass-Koopmans model also allows one to 
discuss how ultimate damages may affect utility directly (3.4). In each case, the Cass-Koopmans 
model allows one to discuss consequences for long-term, steady-state growth—namely steady 
state capital/labor ratios and savings rates—and the optimal transitional dynamics of the economy 
towards the steady state. 
3.2.  The implications of climate-change induced impacts on production factors can be 
significant in a Cass-Koopmans model 
Through both shocks and gradual changes, climate change is likely to cause damages that will 
affect capital and labor directly. The policy components of the climate bill (mitigation, proactive 
adaptation and reactive adaptation) may also affect factors and factor productivity at the margin. 
Impacts on Stock and Productivity of capital (K) 
One-off diminutions of the stock of capital, resulting from, e.g., destruction of factories, farms 
and buildings with cyclones or sea-surges, will affect the savings rate and the rate of growth of 
aggregate output in the short-run, but not in the long-run since the characteristics of the optimal 
steady-state growth path do not depend on the history of capital stock. Following the sudden 
capital depletion and resulting decrease in consumption, it is optimal for the economy to increase 
its savings rate—and thus temporarily increase the growth rate of aggregate output—until the 
steady-state capital/labor ratio is reached. 
Repeated shocks on the stock of capital (e.g., because of an increase in the frequency of 
extreme weather events) will each generate a short-term transition, the repetition of which can be 
modeled as an increase in the capital depreciation rate η. As a result, the steady-state savings rate 
  14increases, the steady-state capital to labor ratio decreases, and the steady-state consumption to 
labor decreases.
16
Temporary changes in the productivity of capital—for example, if climate change temporarily 
reduces water availability in a dam and thus reduces power generation capacity for the same 
stock of capital—
17 do not affect the steady-state growth path (same argument as for one-off 
depletion of capital stock above). Whereas a permanent decline in the productivity of capital 
leads to a lower steady-state savings rate, a lower capital to labor ratio, and usually a lower 
consumption to labor ratio—as can be seen from equations (5)-(7) when changes in the 
productivity of capital are modeled as a diminution of the share of capital in the production 
function α.
18
Finally, sustained impacts of climate change may modify the rate of autonomous technical 
change embedded in capital, either negatively (e.g., because resources are drawn away from 
R&D expenditures) or positively (e.g., because replacement of damaged capital stock increases 
penetration of new technologies). Since the rate of growth of the aggregate output along the 
steady-state growth path is equal to the rate of technical change plus the rate of growth of labor 
stock, any effect of climate change on the rate of autonomous technical change has a direct effect 
on the rate of growth along the steady-state growth path. 
Stock, productivity and growth rate of labor (L) 
Temporary changes in the stock and/or the growth rate of labor—for example, if deaths caused by 
the impacts of climate change reduce the amount of workers in the economy (e.g. due to an 
increase in deadly diseases, such as malaria)—have both a short-term effect on the transitional 
path towards the optimal steady-state growth path, and a long-term effect on the optimal steady-
state growth path, even if the rate of growth of labor g returns to its pre-shock level in the long-
run. The rationale is as follows: the optimal steady-state capital to labor ratio is not modified by 
temporary diminutions in the rate of growth of labor. At any point in time after this temporary 
diminution, however, the level of population is lower relative to what would have happened in the 
absence of the impact. To keep the capital to labor ratio constant, the aggregate level of capital at 
                                                      
16 As can be seen easily by taking the derivatives of equations (5), (6) and (7) with regard to η. 
17 This example about the dam implicitly assumes a multi-sector economy. It still applies in the context of the one-
sector Cass-Koopmans model, since the single productive sector can be interpreted as the aggregate behavior of a 
black box consisting of several sectors whose interactions cannot be observed or are not modeled. 
18 The variations of c with regard to α are computed in the Appendix. 
  15steady-state must also be lower than it would have been in the absence of the temporary 
diminution of the rate of growth of labor.
19
A permanent decrease in the rate of growth of labor g will result in a higher steady-state 
capital to labor ratio, a higher steady-state consumption to labor ratio, and a lower steady-state 
savings rate. It will also lead to a steady-state rate of growth of gross output (precisely equal to g) 
lower than it would have been otherwise.
20  
Temporary changes in the productivity of labor—e.g., if an increase in the prevalence of 
vector-borne disease reduces the average annual amount of labor that individuals can provide—
do not affect the long-run equilibrium growth path. Whereas a permanent decline in the 
productivity of labor leads to a higher steady-state savings rate, a higher capital to labor ratio, and 
a higher consumption to labor ratio—as can be seen from equations (5)-(7) when a decline in the 
productivity of labor is modeled as an increase of the share of capital in the production 
function α. 
Finally, climate change may also induce a permanent decrease in the autonomous rate of 
technical change of the productivity of labor, for example if repeated impacts on population 
disrupt education efforts. In this case, the rate of growth of aggregate output along the steady 
state growth path would also diminish. 
3.3.  The implications of policy or climate-change induced modifications of expenditures 
for growth are limited in a Cass-Koopmans model  
Mitigation policies will generate expenditures, which are usually modeled by adding a drawdown 
Dt on the expenditure/consumption side of the output – expenditure balance (Eq.8).
21 Policies 
favoring reactive adaptation and proactive adaptation will also result in expenditures that can be 
modeled the same way (though most economic models of climate change do not include 
adaptation as a policy variable). The fact that we examine here one common channel by which 
adaptation and mitigation may affect growth (namely, additional expenditures) should not be 
understood to imply that adaptation and mitigation policies do affect growth the same way. In 
                                                      
19 In other words, diminution in population cannot generate an increase in consumption per capita in the Cass-
Koopmans model because ultimately aggregate consumption diminishes by the same percentage.  
20 As can be seen by taking the derivatives of equations (5) to (7) with regard to g. 
21 As noted in section 2.2, remaining ultimate damages may also have an expenditure component (as in Manne and 
Richels, 1992) due to, e.g., relocation costs. The brunt of the remaining ultimate damages though are likely to affect 
factors directly. 
  16fact, policies that promote mitigation and adaptation are different, and they are likely to have 
different implications for economic growth, if only because their implications for the residual 
ultimate damages of climate change differ (as modeled in e.g., Lecocq and Shalizi, 2007). 
 
Yt = F(Kt,Lt) = Ct+It+Dt       ( 8 )  
 
Introducing additional expenditures has the following implications in a Cass-Koopmans 
model. First, temporary changes in expenditures imply no change in the growth rate of aggregate 
output g or in the composition of the steady-state growth path. This is because the steady-state 
growth path depends only on the fundamentals of the economy. 
Second, permanent changes in expenditures, if they are independent of the level of production 
Y—e.g., if D converges towards a constant D∞ strictly positive—do not affect the steady-state 
growth path either. This is because, in the long-run, output dwarfs drawdowns. The transition 
path back to the steady state, however, will be much longer than with temporary drawdowns. 
Third, permanent changes in expenditures, if they are dependent on the level of production Y—
i.e., if they amount to a loss of global productivity of the economy—affect both the transition to 
and the composition of the steady-state growth path. In that case, equation 8 can be rewritten as 
(9) below, where Ωt  = 1- D t /Yt translates the diminution of total factor productivity of the 
economy induced by climate change.
22  
 
Yt = Ωt F(Kt,Lt) = Ct+It        ( 9 )  
 
If Ω converges towards a constant Ω∞ lower than unity, the optimal steady-state capital to 
labor and consumption to labor ratios are reduced—though the optimal steady-state savings rate 
remains constant.
23  
It is also important that because production in the Cass-Koopmans model is assumed to be at 
the frontier, and because—in a one-sector model—there is no mechanism whereby decreased 
production of resources in one part of the economy can be compensated by additional production 
of resources in another, any positive drawdown D (or any total factor productivity correction Ω 
                                                      
22 Remaining ultimate damages have also be represented this way as in, e.g., the DICE model (Nordhaus, 1993). 
23 As can be seen by deriving equations (5) – (7) with regard to A. 
  17lower than unity) results in a lower consumption to labor ratio than would have happened in the 
absence of drawdown or factor productivity correction (this might, of course, be compensated by 
lower damages in the future). In other words, the Cass-Koopmans model does not allow negative 
gross costs of mitigation (the so-called ‘win-win’ mitigation policies).  
3.4.  A modified version of the Cass-Koopmans model allows one to discuss the 
consequences of ultimate damages for economic growth via individuals’ utility functions 
Climate change will also have non-market impacts, both through the disappearance or 
transformation of pure final goods, and through the disappearance or transformation of joint 
goods (i.e., those that are both inputs into the production of consumer goods and directly factored 
into individuals’ utility functions). One example of climate change’s effect on pure final goods is 
the disappearance of culturally significant sceneries
24, landscapes, or biodiversity. One example 
of climate change’s effect on a joint good is the retreat of glaciers in mountain regions, which 
simultaneously affects irrigation and/or electricity generation—a production function effect—, 
and changes vistas—a component of an individual’s well-being. 
Non-market effects of climate change are usually captured by making individual utility 
functions dependent on both consumption and the quality of the environment e. Technically, 
utility functions are written as U = U(c,e) with U increasing in e. 
How is the optimal growth path of consumption affected if the quality of the environment 
decreases with climate change? Adding an exogenously decreasing quality of the environment e 
in the utility function does not modify the optimal growth path if the marginal utility of 






 = 0. But if the 
marginal utility of consumption decreases when the quality of the environment decreases (i.e., 






 > 0), then introducing e in the utility function is equivalent 
                                                      
24 See e.g., Laplante et al. (2005), who show how the preservation of Lake Sevan—an iconic place in Armenian 
history and culture—is highly valued by Armenians, both within the country and abroad. 
  18to increasing the rate of pure time preference.
25 As a result, the faster the environment degrades, 
the lower the steady-state savings rate, the lower the steady-state capital to labor ratio and the 
lower the steady-state consumption to labor ratio.
26 Conversely, if the marginal utility of 






 < 0, i.e., they are 
substitutes), then the steady-state savings rate needs to increase, as does the steady-state capital to 
labor ratio. 
Another implication of this model is that, because e is assumed to become scarcer over time 
relative to c, the rate of discount that should apply to projects that drawdown consumption now 
(ct) to improve the quality of the environment later (et+1) (e.g., mitigation) is lower than the rate 
of discount that should apply to projects that draw on consumption now (ct) to improve 
consumption in the future (ct+1) (see Guesnerie, 2004, for an extensive treatment with a constant 
elasticity of substitution utility function). Substitutability between c and e is a key parameter in 
determining this wedge (Neumayer, 1999). 
Table 2 summarizes the different channels by which components of the climate change bill 
may affect economic growth (both transitional and long term) within a Cass-Koopmans model. A 
key finding is that additional expenditures (caused by mitigation, proactive adaptation, reactive 
adaptation have limited effects on the steady-state growth path, unless those additional 
expenditures grow with output, in which case the total factor productivity of the economy 
decreases. On the other hand, permanent changes in the productivity, stock or depreciation rate of 
capital, as well as both permanent and temporary changes in the stock and growth rate of labor 
(caused by ultimate damages for the most part) do affect the characteristics of the long-term 
steady-state growth path.
27  
                                                      
25 In this case, for any given level of consumption, the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing with e. Since e 
is decreasing over time, the marginal utility of consumption is also decreasing over time. Independently, the same 
amount of marginal utility of consumption has a decreasing value in the intertemporal welfare function (Eq.1) 
because of the pure rate of time preference. The decreasing quality of the environment and the pure rate of time 








 > 0, a degrading e is equivalent to an increase in the pure rate of time preference. For example, if 
U(c,e) = e ln(c), and if e is assumed to degrade at a constant rate h over time with climate change, then it is as if the 
rate of pure time preference increased from δ to δ+h). The implications for the steady-state growth path follow from 
equations (6) and (7). Derivations of the derivative of c with regard to δ is provided in the Appendix. 
27 The analysis summarized in table 2 is based on a Cobb-Douglas production function. More work is required to 
determine the extent to which these results extend to other formulations of the production function as well. 
  19Table 2. Summary of the consequences of the components of the climate change bill for 
economic growth in a Cass-Koopmans model  
Cause  Implications for the 
transition to steady-state 
growth 
Implications for the optimal steady-
state growth path 













(1) Effect on production factors (mostly through UD or RUD) 
One off diminution of the stock of capital K  Temporary increase in 
savings and in growth rate of 
output 
= 
Repeated shocks on capital stock K  Increase in savings and in 
growth rate of output 
- + - = 
Temporary diminution in productivity of capital K    = 
Permanent diminution of productivity of capital K  Decrease in savings rate and 
in growth rate of output 
- -  -
29 = 
Climate change induced decrease in autonomous 
technical change of capital productivity 
  -  -  +  - 
Temporary diminution in productivity of labor L    = 
Permanent diminution in productivity of labor L    +  +  +  = 
Temporary change in the stock or growth rate of 
labor L 
  =  
(though K is higher) 
Permanent decline in the growth rate of labor L    +  -  +  - 
Climate change induced decrease in autonomous 
technical change of labor productivity 
  -  -  +  - 
(2) Effect of additional expenditures (policy components of the climate bill) 
Temporary increase in expenditures D    = 
Permanent increase in expenditures D—
independent of Y 
Longer transition to steady-
state 
= 
Permanent increase in expenditures D—dependent 
on Y 
  - = - = 
(3) Direct CC impacts on utility 
Ultimate damages on the environment reduce e 
when utility function is U(c,e)—e exogenous 
 -  -  -
30 = 
                                                      
28 g when there is no technical change, and g+h when technical change is taken into account. 
29 In most cases. 
  204.  Limitations of the Cass-Koopmans model, and a roadmap for improving analysis of the 
consequences of the climate change bill for economic growth 
The Cass-Koopmans model provides an integrated framework for discussing the implications of 
climate change for economic growth. However, the Cass-Koopmans model is often at odds with 
empirics. In fact, empirical studies consistently suggest that factor accumulation explains no 
more than half of observed growth rates—particularly in developing countries (section 4.1). 
Variations in total factor productivity (TFP) that cannot be explained within the Cass-Koopmans 
framework account for the other half. 
Empirical studies identify determinants of TFP variations. Though there is no consensus on the 
relative importance of these determinants, or even on the list of determinants itself, these studies 
point to important characteristics of the growth process that are intuitively relevant for the 
impacts of climate change, and that are not taken into account in the Cass-Koopmans model. 
These findings provide a roadmap for the rest of the paper (section 4.2). 
4.1.  Empirical studies demonstrate that growth is not just factor accumulation 
The Solow Swan production function which underpins the Cass-Koopmans' optimal growth 
model is the simplest theoretical framework that can be used for empirical growth accounting 
exercises, as it allows the growth rate of aggregate output to be decomposed into the growth rate 
of factor inputs and technology. In the formulation in equation (1), 
 
   Y(t) = A(t) F(K(t),L(t) )          ( 1 0 )  
 
The expression A(t) represents the level of technology which in the empirical literature is 






















+ =        ( 1 1 )  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
30 ibid 
  21Assuming competitive factor markets, the marginal product of capital is equal to the rate of 
return r and the marginal product of labor is equal to the wage rate w. Assuming constant returns 
to scale, the contribution of the growth rate of capital to the growth rate of output can be 
expressed as α and that of the growth rate of labor as 1-α. In other words, the growth rate of 
output can be expressed as the weighted average of the growth rates of the input factors (with the 
weights representing their relative shares in the aggregate output)
31 and of the growth rate of total 
factor productivity  .   A A/ &
With data on the quantity of output and factor inputs, as well as on factor prices, it is possible 
to compute the respective growth rates of output, capital and labor, and factor shares of capital 
and labor. The only unmeasured term would be total factor productivity. But the growth rate of 













Y & & &
)) ( 1 ( ) ( α α − − −         (12)   
 
Using the log form of the variables, the residual in equation (12) is estimated in the growth 
accounting literature. A key finding of this literature is that factor accumulation explains only 
part, typically half or less than half, of observed economic growth rates. This finding holds both 
when looking at panel data for a given country, and when comparing growth rates across 
countries globally (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 2001), or in a region, such as Africa (e.g. O’Connell 
and Ndulu, 2000).
32 In other words, differences in output levels cannot be explained only by 
differences in factor input levels. Similarly, differences in output growth rates cannot be 
explained only by differences in factor input growth rates. Total factor productivity (TFP) 
matters.  
                                                      
31 For derivations see Solow (1956) or Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003). This basic model with a Cobb-Douglas 
production function with constant returns to scale can easily be augmented to include human capital (H) with share 
(β) as a separate explanatory variable as has been done by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).  
32 Unlike in Asia, the Middle East or in developed countries, the residual in Sub Saharan Africa is on average 
negative: i.e. the growth rate as predicted by factor accumulation alone should be significantly higher than observed 
growth rates (O’Connell and Ndulu, 2000). 
  22Beyond this finding, empirical results are not as robust.
33 Theory-based growth accounting 
treats the residual or TFP as a measure of our ignorance. Little progress has been made in 
identifying determinants of TFP growth rates using growth accounting techniques. Instead, 
growth regressions are used to tease out the determinants of TFP growth using cross-country 
variations in TFP growth rates over time and space, based on more informal or ad hoc models of 
growth. Unlike growth accounting, growth regressions estimate the parameters of the production 
function rather than imposing them as is done when constant returns Cobb-Douglas production 
functions are assumed. 
The critique of the growth regression literature has focused primarily on data and 
methodological shortcomings (Temple, 1999).
34 And no empirical (or for that matter theoretical) 
consensus has emerged on the determinants of TFP growth. Different studies use different 
variables and data, and it is not easy to compare results or choose the relative importance of the 
different variables (Levine and Renelt, 1992). This has led to uncertainty on the choice of model. 
“Many variables have been found to be significant in growth regressions; nearly as many have 
been found to be ‘fragile’, in the sense that their statistical significance disappears when a 
different group of right-hand side variables selected” (Temple, 1999). 
Nonetheless, the empirical findings have highlighted certain stylized facts—particularly for 
developing countries—that suggest the explanatory power of existing theoretical models (Cass-
Koopmans or extended versions) is still limited. The following sets of drivers are recognized as 
playing an important role in total factor productivity growth: 
•  Policy and institutional factors: e.g., macroeconomic policy, stabilization policy, property 
rights, rule of law, etc. (which will translate into, inter alia, institutional rigidities) 
•  Structural factors: e.g., changing shares of the agriculture and industry sectors, degree of 
openness of the economy, etc. (which will translate into, inter alia, economic rigidities)  
•  Geographical factors: e.g., landlocked vs. non landlocked countries, proximity and 
agglomeration, etc. (which will translate into, inter alia, spatial rigidities) 
•  Shocks, of whatever nature (terms of trade, financial crises, and natural hazards,…). 
                                                      
33 Typically, empirical findings emerge from the use of econometric techniques that rely on ad hoc models of 
growth. Some of these are reduced form versions of theoretical models, but many introduce additional variables that 
are not explicitly grounded in theoretical models. Because these findings are from reduced-form estimates rather than 
from structural equation estimates, it is more difficult to identify the strength of the different channels through which 
endogenous variables affect growth and hence the ultimate channels through which climate change affects growth. 
  23Among the four sets of determinants outlined above, policies and institutions such as 
macroeconomic policies (inflation/price stability, exchange rate overvaluation, cyclical volatility, 
systemic banking crisis), structural policies (human capital/education, physical capital/public 
infrastructure,…), openness to trade, government size, implementation of anti-corruption laws, or 
availability of credit have been identified as having a significant impact on growth (Loyaza and 
Soto, 2002, Aron, 2000). But it is not clear that climate change will make it easier or on the 
contrary more difficult to adopt them.
35 In any case, the effect of climate change on policy and 
institutional factors will be indirect. 
On the other hand, climate change is likely to have a direct effect on structural factors, 
geographical factors and shocks.  
4.2.  A roadmap for the analysis of the consequences of climate change for economic 
growth beyond the Cass-Koopmans model 
The empirical studies discussed in section 4.1 point to three major characteristics of real-world 
growth processes that (i) are relevant for explaining variations in TFP, (ii) are intuitively relevant 
for the impacts of climate change, but (iii) are not taken into account in the Cass-Koopmans 
framework. 
The first element is a disaggregated representation of the economy. The Cass-Koopmans 
model has only one aggregated sector. Yet as noted above, structural factors can explain 
variations in TFP. It is also clear that the residual damages of climate change will differ across 
sectors, notably between sectors that are climate-sensitive and those that are less so. Third, one 
needs a disaggregated representation of the economy to evaluate the growth implications of 
possible responses to climate change, such as shifts of economic factors from climate sensitive 
sectors to the other sectors. 
Multi-sector growth models (that remain, for the most part, within the neoclassical growth 
framework) are discussed in section 5, along with the effects climate change may have in this 
framework.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
34 Nonetheless, cross-country regressions using aggregate data are likely to continue to complement historical case 
studies of growth or a micro database estimation of parameters and factor shares.  
35 Other factors such as the level of foreign investment and aid are also recognized as playing a role (Easterly and 
Levine, 2001) , but again the influence of climate change on these, if any, is less direct. 
  24The second element is a better representation of rigidities and transitional dynamics. As 
noted in Section 2, the ultimate damages of climate change are likely to result in an increase in 
the frequency and magnitude of shocks which, in turn, have an implication for TFP. In addition, 
policy efforts that are concentrated in time—most notably reactive adaptation—may also be akin 
to shocks. Yet the Cass-Koopmans model is not designed to analyze short-term reactions to 
shocks because it assumes immediate clearing of all markets without rigidities.
36  
Section 6 discusses how taking rigidities into account modifies the dynamics of economic 
growth—using ‘eclectic’ models that are no longer within the strict neoclassical growth 
framework. It then discusses the potential impacts of future climatic shocks on economic growth 
based on the empirical literature about past occurrences of such shocks. 
The third element is to introduce increasing returns in production functions. From a 
theoretical standpoint, the fact that growth can only be sustained through exogenous population 
growth and exogenous technical change is a fundamental limitation of the Cass-Koopmans 
model, and it stems from the diminishing returns assumption in the production function. From an 
empirical perspective, increasing returns are observed locally in many sectors or regions: for 
example, correlations between geography and growth are rooted in part on increasing returns to 
agglomeration. 
Section 7 discusses how the consequences of the climate change bill for economic growth may 
differ when increasing returns are introduced into aggregated models, in endogenous growth 
models and in poverty trap models. It then examines how the presence of increasing returns at the 
sectoral level may generate lock-ins and affect the costs of shifting from one growth path to the 
other (e.g., positively if one can take advantage of increasing returns to reduce the costs of 
mitigation/adaptation, negatively if one has to get away from an existing lock-in to highly 
carbon-intensive technologies). Finally, section 7 discusses some implications of geographical 
increasing returns for the effects of climate change on growth. 
                                                      
36 A possible explanation for observed growth paths deviating from steady-state growth paths could be that we are 
observing transitional paths in the Cass Koopmans model, not to the permanent steady-state growth path. But King 
and Rebelo (1993) find that transitions in optimal economic growth models are short in most cases. Thus, sustained 
growth dynamics observed in the real-world cannot easily be explained by the transition dynamics of neoclassical 
growth models. 
  255.  Opening the black box: Consequences of the components of the climate bill for growth 
when more than one sector and region is considered 
In this section, we focus on models with a disaggregated representation of the economy. We start 
with the Uzawa model, a neoclassical growth model similar to Cass-Koopmans’, but with an 
economy with a consumption and an intermediate or investment good, and then discuss the 
consequences of the components of the climate change bill for economic growth in models with 
two (or more) consumption goods, and in models where primary energy is introduced as a 
separate production factor.  
The aggregate representation of the economy in the Cass-Koopmans model does not allow one 
to capture the underlying structure of the economy, notably differences in technology and 
differences between intermediate and final goods, and their implications for growth. As a result, 
multi-sector growth models have been developed, starting with the two-sector neoclassical 
growth model by Uzawa (1961, 1963). It extends the Solow-Swan growth model by considering 
both a consumer good and an investment good that is entirely invested to generate new capital 
stock. Both goods are produced with capital and labor, which are assumed to be perfectly mobile 
across sectors. The standard neoclassical assumption that production factors have diminishing 
returns (in both consumer good and investment good production functions) remains. 
In the optimal growth version of the model, the central planner allocates capital and labor 
across sectors at each period of time to maximize an intertemporal welfare function. Uzawa 
(1964) demonstrates that for any initial capital / labor ratio, the optimal path converges towards a 
unique steady-state growth path. In this steady-state growth path, aggregate capital grows at the 
rate of growth of labor, and the capital/labor ratio is constant in each sector. The overall 
dynamics of the Uzawa model is thus very similar to the dynamics of the Cass-Koopmans model, 
except that the path towards steady-state differs sharply depending on whether it is the 
investment good or the consumption goods that is more capital-intensive. 
The implications of shocks on production factors and of increases in expenditures on 
economic growth, thus, have similar implications for long-term aggregate growth in the Uzawa 
model and in the Cass Koopmans model. A key difference, however, is that impacts or shocks on 
one sector propagate to the other. Let us assume, for example, that climate change results in a 
decrease of total factor productivity in the consumption goods sector—for example, if the 
consumption goods sector is interpreted as agriculture. As a result, more factors (capital and 
  26labor) are required to produce the same amount of the consumer good. Given decreasing returns 
to production factors in both sectors, the new steady-state growth path will necessarily have a 
lower consumption per capita than without the decrease in productivity in the consumption goods 
sector. Full factor mobility, on the other hand, ensures that the transition towards the new optimal 
growth path is immediate, and that there is no supplemental loss in the transition. A similar result 
would be obtained for changes in the total factor productivity of the investment sector. Finally, 
since the relative capital intensity in the two sectors is a major determinant of the transitional path 
towards the steady state, a climate-change induced modification of the marginal productivity of 
factors may have significant implications for the transitional growth path if it triggers an 
inversion of the relative capital intensity in the two sectors.  
When two consumption goods are introduced in the neoclassical framework—for example to 
analyze the relationships between economic growth and international trade (e.g., Brecher et al., 
2005)—there still exists a steady-state growth path where aggregate capital in both sectors and 
aggregate consumption increase at the same rate. In such a model, a climate-induced decline in 
the productivity of one sector necessarily leads to a decrease in global welfare. Because of the 
diminishing returns assumption to factors in all production functions, the reallocation of capital 
and labor across sectors—even if instantaneous and frictionless—cannot compensate for the 
productivity decline. Growth models with more than two sectors exhibit complex dynamics that 
do not necessarily yield steady-states (e.g., Gale, 1967, Scheinkman, 1976), but as long as 
decreasing returns and factor mobility remain, shocks on the productivity of one sector cannot be 
offset or compensated for by the other.
37
A third class of disaggregated growth models of particular relevance to the present analysis are 
the models where energy is explicitly introduced as an intermediate good. Initially developed 
after the first oil shock to evaluate how an increase in energy prices might affect growth (e.g., 
Hudson and Jorgenson, 1974), these models form the basis of most of the numerical analysis of 
the costs of mitigation policies (Table 3). The modeling framework is usually a multi-sector, 
computable general equilibrium model with so-called KLEM production functions (capital, labor, 
energy, manufacturing)—the factor energy being itself a composite good combining the output 
from several sub-sectors (such as coal, oil, gas, nuclear, etc.)—with an aggregate growth equation 
                                                      
37 If there are barriers to factor mobility; and if these barriers are reduced because of a climate-change induced shock, 
there may be positive implications for intertemporal welfare—but these gains are related to the lifting of the barriers, 
not to the climate induced shocks themselves.  
  27attached to it. Given the large number of sectors involved and the policy oriented application of 
this research, these models are solved numerically.  
A key determinant of the modeling results is the degree of substitutability between energy and 
capital. Estimating elasticities of substitution is difficult because energy usually represents a 
small share of total factor costs, and because short-run and long-run elasticities differ. 
Econometric estimates show both complementarity and substitutability—though there are reasons 
to believe that there is overall substitutability at the global level (Thompson and Taylor, 1995).
 
Using these models, the IPCC (Barker et al., 2007) reports relatively modest median 
reductions in average World Gross Product growth rates over the next decades (0.12 percentage 
point below baseline each year over the next 50 years for stabilization objectives of 445-535 
ppm), though the range of modeling results is large.
38 The treatment of substitution between 
energy and capital in each model, and thus the underlying assumptions about malleability of 
capital, along with underlying assumptions about technical change, seem to account for a major 
part of observed differences in modeling results (Fischer and Morgenstern, 2006, make this point 
in a meta-analysis of modeling results—though focused on carbon prices, not on growth rates 
per se). 
The previous discussion raises a general methodological point of the paper. We assume that 
the results of numerical models that assess climate policies are driven largely by the structure of 
the underlying growth model. In fact, by showing how different classes of growth models do or 
do not capture key empirical features of economic growth (e.g., role of shocks, etc.), the paper 
partially vindicates this assumption. However, it remains unclear how the dynamics of numerical 
models depend on specific assumptions within broad model classes. In addition, in the absence of 
careful ‘controlled experiments’, it is often unclear to what extent published results of models 
depend on the values assumed for parameters / scenarios, and to what extent they depend on 
structural features of the growth engine. In fact, even the best reviews of models report only on 
costs, without analyzing in depth the structural equations that may underpin differences across 
models (e.g., Weyant, 1999). The complexity of the numerical models and the difficulty of 
setting up proper comparisons make these exercises difficult—yet they are very important for 
policy purposes, as illustrated by the following two examples. 
                                                      
38 These figures are reported against a counterfactual with no damage which, as noted above, is not sufficient to rank 
policy options and may lead to biased estimates of impacts on economic growth (see discussion in Section 2.3) 
<<which we have stated is not policy relevant. Should that point be restated here again?>>. 
  28  29
                                                     
First, Shelby et al. (2006) compare the mitigation costs in the electricity sector in the U.S. for 
two computable general equilibrium models. They find that different representations of how 
decisions regarding renewable energy technologies are made lead to major differences in 
modeling results regarding not only the behavior of fuel markets, but also in the behavior 
economy-wide variables such as investment and total output. Similarly, the IMACLIM-R model 
(Crassous et al., 2006) shows that mitigation policies have relatively low effects on GDP growth 
rates when there are no rigidities in relevant energy markets, but somewhat higher effects when 
there are rigidities. In both cases, the consequences for growth are minimal compared to other 
climate change models that do not incorporate ‘learning by doing’ and the rapid decline in the 
cost of alternate technologies (Shalizi, 2007). More work is thus required to understand how the 
structure of the models drives results. 
To sum up, growth models with two or more sectors thus provide some insights on the 
economy-wide implications of impacts of climate change on sub-sectors of the economy. They 
confirm the intuition that climate change-induced changes in the structure of steady-state growth 
in one sector will translate into changes in the structure of steady-state growth in the other sector 
and, in turn, on the structure of steady-state growth in the whole economy.
39 The models also 
underline the importance of factor mobility (capital and labor) across sectors as a key determinant 
of the ability of the economy as a whole to adjust to the impacts of climate change (see Section 6 
for further discussion on shocks). The Uzawa type theoretical models, however, assume 
decreasing returns to scale in all sectors. As a result, costs in one sector cannot be fully offset by 
benefits in another. To allow costs in one sector to be offset by benefits in another, models with 




39 This is because the sectors cannot be insulated from each other— a point that is easier to illustrate when direct and 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 6.  Focusing on the transition to steady-state: Consequences of the components of the 
climate bill for growth when the interaction between shocks and rigidities are taken 
into account 
The models described so far have focused on long-term steady-state growth paths and rested on 
the assumption that there were no rigidities in prices or in factor allocation across sectors. As a 
result, readjustments to a new optimal growth path after perturbations are instantaneous and 
costless. For shorter horizons in terms of the climate change problem (a decade or two), however, 
growth models need to take into account the significant rigidities in prices and factor allocations 
observed in practice due to, inter alia, non-malleability of capital stock, institutional 
rigidities/persistence of transaction costs, inability to compensate losers, especially among the 
Poor, entrenched interests, etc. Even when a few rigidities are introduced in simple growth 
models, their behavior is significantly altered. For example, Ryder (1969) demonstrates that in a 
vintage version of the Uzawa model where new capital is assigned once and for all to a sector, the 
optimal path towards steady-state is much more complex as capital reallocation across sectors can 
only occur at the margin. In such a model, it is likely that readjustment from one steady-state to 
another following a climate-change induced shock on capital stock or capital productivity would 
prove more difficult as well.  
The main question for the present paper is to understand how climate-change induced shocks 
may effect economic growth not just in the long-term, but also in the medium- and short-term. As 
noted in section 2, ultimate damages and reactive adaptation policies are likely to produce 
shocks, especially in the case of specific/sudden events associated with climate change. However, 
mitigation and proactive adaptation may also occasionally involve concentrated efforts akin to 
shocks. The empirical literature on growth provides findings that are directly applicable to this 
question. The central message of this literature is that observed costs of shocks for growth are 
rather high. By implication, the potential costs of climate-change related extreme weather events 
in the future might also be important. 
A large empirical literature demonstrates that shocks—arising from sudden changes in 
commodity prices/terms of trade shocks, financial crises, and/or natural hazards/climate events—
lead to volatility in growth and play a significant role in explaining cross-country economic 
performances (e.g., Easterly et al., 1993, Collier and Dehn, 2001). The drivers of vulnerability to 
  31shocks include the structure of the economy, presence of rigidities in markets or other 
institutions. However, there is no consensus on the relative ranking of these drivers.  
Developing countries often draw a large share of their GDP from agriculture and tourism, two 
sectors strongly dependent on climate, and often rely heavily on the export of a handful of 
primary commodities. These countries are thus particularly vulnerable to natural disasters and to 
commodity price shocks. For example, the IMF (2003) finds that large-scale natural disasters 
have occurred on average once every 20 years in LDCs over the 1977-2001 period, with an 
average impact on GDP ranging from -2.7% to -5.8% in the most recent (1997-2001) period—
during which the highest number of disasters also occurred. This study also notes that the impact 
of shocks on income and growth can be very significant, particularly if part of the infrastructure 
is destroyed and/or if the shock is long-lasting.
40 Since climate change may increase the 
frequency and severity of natural disasters, whether through specific events (cyclones) or through 
gradual changes in local climate, such as core precipitation patterns,
41 the empirical findings 
above suggest that climate change could strongly affect growth in developing countries, in the 
absence of policies to mitigate or adapt in anticipation.  
Besides dependency on climate-related sectors, technological and institutional rigidities—i.e., 
unemployment, inventories, or institutional barriers to rapid disbursement of emergency funds—
are found to significantly increase the costs of shocks (as well as costs of mitigation / anticipative 
adaptation) in terms of growth in the short to medium-term. First, price and wage rigidities 
prevent rapid adaptation. Second, there are generally limitations on the speed at which 
reconstruction expenditures can be absorbed, as demonstrated in recent events such as the Indian 
Ocean tsunami.
42 Overall, Hallegatte et al. (2007) estimate that when the pre-existing rigidities 
and limitations on reconstruction expenditures are taken into account, costs of shocks may 
                                                      
40 Martin and Bargawi (2004) use this data to project that economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa countries could be 
reduced by half between 2004 and 2015 because of shocks (both commodity price shocks and natural disasters), 
compared with an hypothetical ‘without shock’ projection. 
41 O’Connel and Ndulu (2000) provide an estimate of the impact of climate shocks on economic growth by 
regressing growth in real GDP per capita over a set of factors including the average proportion of dry years per half 
decade (an indicator with strong variation across sub-Saharan Africa countries, ranging from 0.057 in Burundi to 
0.665 in Guinea). According to the regression, a 1% increase in the proportion of dry years per half decade could 
reduce growth by about 0.02% per annum. 
42 For example, UNDP (2006) notes that “a major problem in the [post-tsunami] recovery effort is the time it has 
taken to provide people with decent housing”, because of e.g., delays in getting approvals for projects involving 
multiple actors and stakeholders This problem is not limited to developing countries as evidenced by hurricane 
Katrina in the U.S. (e.g., Sobel and Leeson, 2006). Similarly in Europe, in the wake of the 1999 Lothar and Martin 
storms, loggers suddenly found themselves in short supply and their hourly wage increased ten-fold, thereby both 
slowing down and increasing the costs of clearing forests. 
  32increase 2-4 fold relative to a model where prices adjust immediately, and where reconstruction 
expenditures are not limited. Third, the costs of climatic shocks may also be magnified by non-
economic institutional factors. For example, Rodrick (1999) finds that countries with weak 
institutions and divided societies (as measured by indicators of inequality or ethnic 
fragmentation) face the highest costs of damages. 
These costs highlight the possible benefits of ex ante policies (both mitigation and proactive 
adaptation). What differentiates successful countries (in terms of reducing their per capita GDP 
gap with industrial countries) from unsuccessful ones is their ability to reduce the volatility of 
growth. Decisive responses to shocks and reduction of vulnerabilities help reduce the cost of 
shocks. “Developing countries experience a year of negative per capita growth roughly once 
every three years–whereas in East Asia, the average is one half that rate and, in OECD countries, 
one third that rate. The East Asia region’s ability to avoid shock induced downturns and periods 
of low growth explains much of the East Asian “miracle” (Zagha et al. 2006).  
7.  Incorporating non-convexities: Consequences of the components of the climate bill for 
growth when increasing returns are (locally) possible 
7.1.  Implications of climate change for growth in aggregated models with increasing 
returns 
One of the major limitations of the standard neoclassical growth theory in representing empirical 
findings about real-world processes is the assumption of diminishing returns to each factor when 
the others are held constant, which makes it impossible for the model to generate long-term 
growth per capita save for assuming an exogenous driver of total factor productivity, such as 
technological change. This theoretical deficiency of the Solow model, along with its inability to 
account for empirical ‘stylized facts’ about economic growth (cf. Section 4) has spurred the 
development of a large number of models with increasing returns. One set of models introduce 
zones of locally increasing returns in the production function of neoclassical growth models—
thus generating the possibility of poverty trap dynamics when random shocks are taken into 
account. A second set of models are endogenous growth models, where increasing returns is 
explicitly represented at the technology or at the human capital level—thereby generating 
economic growth endogenously. 
  33Adding increasing returns into the production function of a Cass-Koopmans model and 
random shocks create the possibility of poverty traps 
When increasing returns are introduced into the production function of a neoclassical growth 
model, the model may exhibit several equilibria at various levels of capital to labor ratio for the 
same exogenously given growth rate of output. Which equilibrium the model will converge to 
will depend on the initial level of capital to labor ratio. Within an optimal growth setting, the 
planner can always put the economy on track to reach the best equilibrium by choosing the 
optimal level of investment. If, on the other hand, the rate of savings is fixed (or, to provide a 
politically more realistic assumption—upward bounded), not all equilibria may be accessible and 
the economy might get locked into a poverty trap (see Azariadis and Stachurski, 2004 for a 
thorough review). 
If, in addition, random shocks on the total factor productivity of the economy are introduced, 
then it is possible that even countries that are at a high equilibrium will fall into a low equilibrium 
if they are hit by a large shock.
43 Not only the magnitude of shocks. but also their frequency can 
play an important role in generating poverty traps.  
Traditional growth models, with or without rigidities in price adjustments, predict that shocks 
(such as those arising from climate change) will have temporary impacts on growth, countries 
eventually moving back to their pre-shock growth path. But ‘poverty trap’ models suggest that 
shocks may also have long-lasting consequences because accelerated shocks and/or higher 
variance (such as the increased frequency of climate shocks in the form of droughts, floods, 
cyclones, sea surges, etc.) may reduce the chances that developing countries will grow out of 
poverty traps, and increase the chances that they will get into such traps if not there already 
(Azariadis and Stachurski, 2004). Thus, climate change can be expected to push more vulnerable 
countries into poverty traps causing their growth to decelerate or stagnate, and to increase the 
probability that they will become long-term dependent on international transfers.
 44  
                                                      
43 Conversely, by analogy, it is theoretically possible for a country at a low-level equilibrium to get out of a poverty 
trap if the shock is positive and sufficiently large. 
44 Empirical evidence to date is not conclusive on the existence of poverty traps (Kraay and Raddatz, 2007). For that 
reasons and also on feasibility grounds, the policy recommendation that stems from poverty trap models—namely 
providing massive aid to lift countries out of poverty traps—is also controversial.  
  34Implications of climate change for economic growth in endogenous growth models  
Two main routes have been explored to endogenise the rate of growth. A first approach is to 
broaden the concept of capital to include human and institutional capital,  in addition to 
physical capital, and to assume that diminishing returns do not apply to this wider definition of 
capital. In such models, as pioneered by Lucas (1988), human capital substitutes labor as a factor 
of production. But unlike labor, human capital can be produced through education. As a result, 
the rate of growth of both production factors is endogenous, and the model can generate growth 
per capita without invoking exogenous drivers such as autonomous technical change. 
In models with human capital, the impacts of climate change on population (via diseases and 
premature mortality) have potentially larger consequences for growth, at least in the short- and 
medium-term, than in models without human capital. This is because a reduction in population 
(for example working age adults) simultaneously reduces the stock of human capital thereby 
limiting both the production of physical goods and the production of new human capital. On the 
other hand, one-off reductions in the stock of human capital may not necessarily have long-
lasting impacts on the long-term growth path because these shocks can be offset by higher 
investment in education in the future. 
Thus, the Cass-Koopmans model which does not take into account the role of human capital in 
economic growth, potentially underestimates the consequences for growth of adverse climate 
change impacts on population—the latter operating through two different channels concurrently 
(the reduction of the population in the labor force, as well as, the human capital they embody). 
A second route to internalize growth rates is to recognize that technical change is a major 
driver of economic growth, and to model technological change directly. This approach was 
pioneered by Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), and it has spurred many 
developments over the past two decades. In these models, technological change is usually driven 
by R&D expenditures and/or by learning by doing mechanisms (Arrow, 1962). 
Ultimate damages of climate change could affect the drivers of technological change in this 
framework if climate change impacts adversely affect the availability of physical, human and 
institutional resources for research and development of new technologies. Endogenous growth 
models are useful for understanding how ex ante policies, such as mitigation (and proactive 
adaptation) might affect growth. In particular, when induced technological change is assumed, 
the high costs of shifting investment from carbon-intensive to less carbon-intensive sectors (or 
  35from climate-sensitive to less climate-sensitive sectors) in the case of mitigation are at least 
partially offset by the fact that the higher investment in the desired sectors triggers rapid 
technological change, thereby reducing the costs of the new alternate technologies. The overall 
effect of mitigation on economic growth becomes ambiguous. Numerical modeling of the 
implications of induced technical change has yielded conflicting results in the past.
45 But a 
consensus seems to be emerging around the notion that induced technological change is an 
important driver of the costs of mitigation policies, especially in the long-run (for the cost of the 
backstop technology). That effect, however, may not necessarily be sufficient to fully offset high 
abatement costs in the near-term. Thus, in general, models with induced technical change still 
conclude that mitigation reduces GDP growth (relative to the without climate change case they 
use as baseline—see Section 2.3 for a discussion of the inappropriateness of this baseline), but to 
a lesser extent than in models with exogenous technical change only (Grubb et al., 2006).  
A final insight from the economic growth literature with induced technological change is that 
mitigation policies in the energy sector may affect the production function of the composite good 
(despite the fact that energy typically represents a small share of factor costs) because of changes 
in the prices of non-energy goods, changes in labor costs, changes in the costs of capital (through 
changes in the savings rate and in the cost of equipment).
46 In addition to factor reallocation and 
price changes, already discussed in Section 5, changes in technology add a third channel through 
which action in one sector may affect productivity in others.
47
7.2.  Increasing returns also create the possibility of lock-ins in development paths, with 
major implications for the impacts of climate change on economic growth  
Adding increasing returns (including, but not limited to, induced technical change)—to a growth 
model with two sectors or more creates path dependency and opens up the possibility of lock-ins.  
                                                      
45 Top-down studies, such as Goulder and Schneider (1999), suggest that the presence of induced technological 
change do not significantly reduce costs of mitigation because higher technological change in low-carbon intensity 
sectors crowds out technological change that would have occurred in other sectors, thus averaging out over the whole 
economy. But bottom-up studies tend to exhibit large cost reductions as a result of adoption of new technologies 
(e.g., Grubler et al., 1999). Grubb, et al (2006) suggests that bottom-up and top-down approaches are slowly 
converging. 
46 Ghersi and Hourcade (2006), who make this argument, show numerically that the implications for the evaluation 
of mitigation policies can be significant. 
47 The same reasoning could apply to proactive adaptation as well, to the extent that mechanisms such as increasing 
returns to adoption or economies of scale reduce the costs of adaptation technologies. 
  36Lock-ins were initially defined for technologies (Arthur, 1989). When two technologies 
compete, increasing returns (e.g., network externalities, learning by doing, economies of scale, 
etc.) may result in a situation in which one technology or format completely dominates the 
market except for niches. Examples abound, such as between the BETAMAX and VHS standards 
for videocassettes, between the QWERTY and AZERTY keyboards for typewriters, or between 
light- and heavy-water nuclear reactors (Cowan, 1990). 
Krugman (1995)
48 extended the concept to economic geography showing that lock-ins may 
also occur in the spatial organization of cities or regions. For example, increasing returns to 
agglomeration may make new investments very costly to locate in new centers once a productive 
nucleus is established in an existing center. By analogy, a city with initially low population 
density may generate higher demand for private car mobility, thereby increasing demand for 
roads, making it easier for sprawl to develop by cutting transportation costs, and thus keeping 
density low even as population increases. This eventually leads to a spatial structure that is locked 
into a pattern where public transportation is inefficient and where cars are required—with adverse 
consequences for the use of fossil fuels and the generation of carbon emissions with current 
technologies. 
The concept may also apply to institutions. For example, cap-and-trade and coordinated taxes 
were competing instruments on the negotiation table prior to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (1992). A series of incremental steps, some of them fortuitous, started to tilt the 
balance in favor of the cap-and-trade approach. Though no negotiation had taken place, each 
made it more difficult for negotiators to return back to taxes, and when the negotiation mandate 
for the Kyoto Protocol was laid out in 1995, the cap-and-trade approach imposed itself as quasi 
evidence (Hourcade, 2002). Furthermore, the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol has resulted 
in the creation of a host of public institutions (e.g., the Executive Board of the Clean 
Development Mechanism, Designated National Authorities leveling each country) and private 
institutions (consultants, providers of registries, traders, brokers, exchanges, etc.) with vested 
interest in the continuation of the approach.
49 Shifting to a coordinated tax regime beyond 2012, 
as some have suggested (e.g., Nordhaus, 2001), thus faces important hurdles. 
 
                                                      
48 And later in Fujita et al. (1999) 
49 The cap-and-trade approach has also been adopted by other regimes in Europe, Australia, Japan or the U.S. 
  37Though it manifests itself in the selection of one particular technology, city structure or 
institutional arrangement, a lock-in is in fact a systemic effect: part of the economic system 
adapts to deliver or support one technology to the detriment of the other. In the QWERTY vs. 
AZERTY competition for example, increasing returns exist both on the supply side, where it is 
easier to produce one type of typewriter instead of two, and on the demand side, where labor 
productivity is higher if individuals moving from one firm to another do not have to undertake 
arduous training in another system. 
The discussion above suggests that lock-ins may have significant implications, in some cases 
positive, and in others negative, for the relationship between the components of the climate bill 
and economic growth. Self-reinforcing mechanisms facilitating the adoption of carbon-free 
technologies will be considered good from the point of view of ex ante climate policies (such as 
mitigation and proactive adaptation), whereas similar mechanisms making it more difficult to get 
out of carbon-intensive technologies will be considered as bad.  
Isolated empirical findings suggest that positive lock-ins may go a long way towards offsetting 
mitigation costs. For example, in an analysis of how France, Germany (and Japan and Italy) 
responded to the first oil shock, Hourcade and Kostopoulou (1994) show that (i) distinctly 
different solutions were adopted by each country, with France moving aggressively to develop 
domestic nuclear supply and a new building code, and Germany supporting industrial exports to 
compensate its trade balance deficit in the energy sector; (ii) that as a result CO2 emissions per 
unit of GDP diminished by half in France and “only” by a quarter in Germany between 1971 and 
1990 (IEA, 2004); and yet that (iii) the macroeconomic performances of these countries has been 
relatively comparable over the period (2.24% annual GDP growth rate in France against 2.42% 
annual average annual GDP growth rate in Germany), suggesting that widely different 
environmental outcomes can be obtained at similar welfare costs in the long-run. Part of the 
difference can be traced to the fact that France has taken advantage of a positive lock-in into 
nuclear energy (reaping benefits from economies of scale in nuclear capacity, and over time in 
increasing reliance on electric radiators in buildings).  
There is, however, little evidence, either theoretical or empirical, on the implications of lock-
ins for growth, and this is an important topic for future research. 
  387.3.  Growth benefits from geographic concentration: as a result, localized impacts of 
climate change on a growth ‘nucleus’/engine of growth center could have disproportionate 
impacts on economic growth 
Empirical analysis shows that economic activity tends to be highly concentrated, at all 
geographical scales, that production factors, both capital and labor (both skilled and unskilled) 
tend to accumulate geographically, and that wealth also tends to be increasingly concentrated. 
This is inconsistent with basic factor accumulation models which predict that capital should flow 
from developed (rich) to less developed (poor) regions or countries. Complete microeconomic 
explanations for such concentrations are still missing, but agglomeration economies and 
economies of scale are clearly playing a role. 
Recent work on economic geography provides further insights on how climate change may 
affect location-dependent growth processes. One strand of the economic geography literature 
focuses on the location of economic activity (including industry) in terms of the attractiveness of 
natural characteristics of locations (Sachs et al., 1999) such as climate, prevalence of diseases, 
natural resources, etc. (its “first advantage” in the expression of Burgess and Venables, 2004). 
This strand overlaps with the older urban geography tradition which saw cities as locating in 
areas that could be defended with adequate local water and food resources. Another strand of the 
economic geography literature, as mentioned above, focuses on the location of economic activity 
in terms of proximity and increasing returns (Fujita et al., 1999), that provide competitive 
advantages such as positive agglomeration externalities and the creation of thick markets 
(“second advantage”). This strand overlaps with the older urban geography tradition which saw 
cities locating at the crossroads of trade and transportation routes (initially rivers, later roads and 
ports). However, unlike the earlier tradition the new economic geography's focus on increasing 
returns provides a theoretical underpinning for path dependency and the observed persistence of 
primary cities and their continued enlargement. 
Climate change may affect this dynamic at two levels. First, climate is one element of the 
“first advantage”. The incidence and spread of diseases like malaria due to climate change may 
slow the growth of the TFP parameter in countries or regions where those diseases were not 
prevalent before. Second, growth centers, once established, can become concentrated engines of 
growth. Severe impacts of climate change on either the growth centers themselves or the 
  39infrastructure that links them to other markets (roads, ports) may have disproportionately large 
impacts on country-level economic growth, even if the event is very localized.
50  
Concentration of factors and output in climate-vulnerable areas increases potential damages of 
climate change. For example, if sea transportation remains cheaper than land or air transportation, 
export industries have an advantage in locating on coasts. But by doing so, they also become 
more vulnerable to climate change induced sea-level rise, hurricanes, and associated sea surges. 
Thus, in the longer run climate change might reduce the comparative advantage of being a coastal 
country relative to a landlocked one if the cost of business increases, because of disruptions 
associated with flooding and sea surges, or higher infrastructure costs to avoid them.  
8.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have briefly reviewed the economic growth literature, both theoretical and 
empirical,
51 as well as the literature on the economic modeling of climate change to examine how 
the four components of the climate change bill (namely, mitigation, anticipative adaptation, 
reactive adaptation, and ultimate impacts of climate change) can affect economic growth. The 
technical results from the review are summarized in Appendix 2, and our main findings are as 
follows. 
(1) A trivial but important methodological point is that since climate change is no longer a 
hypothetical possibility, measuring (gross) costs against a ‘without climate change’ business-as-
usual (BAU) scenario has no policy relevance. The correct counterfactual to rank policies is a 
BAU scenario in the presence of climate change—i.e., one in which no action is taken and the 
full ‘ultimate damages’ of climate change are incurred. This recommendation is made knowing 
the difficulty of estimating the size and timing of damages. In addition, even evaluating (gross) 
costs and (gross) benefits of policy actions separately, as is common practice, may be misleading 
since the two are not independent (see Lecocq and Shalizi 2007).  
                                                      
50 Because these centers concentrate the production of GDP, there is a strong incentive for the private sector, as well 
as, the public sector to protect those centers with anticipative adaptation measures. 
51 In order to keep the length of this paper manageable, the recent growth models and modifications of the CK model 
are not covered with the same analytical depth as the earlier CK frameworks. However, we believe that our coverage 
is complete enough so that key insights about economic growth have not been left aside. One area we have covered 
only in passing (and that may justify further work) is growth in open economies. Another is the literature on short-
term growth and business cycles, which is relevant for the more immediate impacts of the different climate change 
policies. 
  40(2) The ultimate damages (or remaining ultimate damages of climate change) may 
significantly affect economic growth—particularly when rigidities and increasing returns are 
taken into account. The ultimate impacts of climate change encompass both gradual changes in 
climatic averages (precipitation, temperature, etc.) and increases in the frequency and magnitude 
of shocks. In the theoretical literature, gradual changes in climate can be modeled by gradual 
losses of productivity (either of selected factors or of aggregate output). In the set of neoclassical 
models discussed in Sections 3 and 5, productivity losses result in temporary drops of economic 
growth and/or in a modified composition of the long-term growth path (capital to labor ratio, 
consumption to labor ratio and savings rate), but not in a change in the growth rate of output 
(used here as a proxy for welfare). 
However, extensions of the neo-classical model suggest that climate-induced reductions in the 
stock of factors of production (both capital and labor) can have significant implications for 
transitional and long-term growth. Climate change effects on population (via e.g. diseases or 
outmigration) appear to be particularly important as the rate of growth of the economy might be 
reduced even in neoclassical models, and as endogenous growth models underscore the critical 
role of human capital for economic growth. 
The empirical literature shows that climatic shocks have already had large impacts on 
economic growth in some countries—thus suggesting that future climatic shocks, especially if 
they are larger and more frequent, may affect economic growth further in the same countries as 
well as in others. Though there is no empirical or theoretical consensus on the key mechanisms 
through which climate shocks have such large impacts on growth, a number of factors, such as 
the size of climate sensitive sectors, the indirect impacts on non climate-sensitive sectors, and 
rigidities in factor allocation and in price adjustments appear to play an important role. 
Finally, in heterodox/non-neoclassical models, when the aggregate production function 
exhibits local increasing returns, economic growth might become path dependent with multiple 
equilibria. And when stochastic shocks are introduced, there is the possibility that countries fall 
into and remain locked in ‘poverty traps’. An increase in the frequency and magnitude of shocks 
due to climate change would increase the chance of countries falling into poverty traps or reduce 
their chances of getting out of them. Similarly, increasing returns to agglomeration can magnify 
the national or global consequences for economic growth of localized impacts of climate change 
on key localities (i.e. those where engines of growth are located). 
  41(3) We have not identified specific consequences for economic growth arising from reactive 
adaptation. As noted in Section 2, however, reactive adaptation, like damages, may require 
efforts that are highly concentrated in time. The discussions above about shocks and the role of 
rigidities thus apply. 
(4) The implications of mitigation and proactive adaptation for economic growth are 
more ambiguous—especially when increasing returns are factored in. Mitigation and proactive 
adaptation are more likely to result in a reallocation of expenditures towards less carbon-intensive 
and less climate-sensitive technologies/sectors. In a neoclassical growth model, additional 
expenditures have limited impact on long-term economic growth, except if the expenditures are 
proportional to output. Implications for transitional growth, on the other hand, might be 
significant depending on the size of the output, especially when energy is introduced as a factor 
of production. In the latter case, the capital/energy substitution rate becomes a critical parameter 
of the model. 
When increasing returns are introduced, the picture becomes more complicated. On the one 
hand, there is an emerging consensus that induced technical change reduces the costs of 
mitigation, though not enough to entirely offset them, at least in the short run. (Though this 
finding is related to mitigation, it is likely that it also applies to anticipative adaptation action 
since the development of new technologies is also necessary.) More generally, increasing returns 
creates the potential for lock-ins (technical, geographical, institutional). The consequences of 
mitigation for economic growth might be less important when ‘good’ increasing returns 
mechanisms are harnessed. However, ‘bad’ lock-ins (for example, if they are a result of 
investments in carbon-intensive and/or climate sensitive activities) may substantially increase the 
costs of future action.  
(5) Understanding the effects of climate change on economic growth not only requires 
that climate change models incorporate more up-to-date knowledge already available about 
growth dynamics, but also that more effort is devoted to closing the gaps in the theoretical 
and empirical literature on growth.  As far as the theoretical literature on growth is 
concerned, two major gaps are identified. The first is on disentangling the channels through 
which climate shocks affect economies (directly and indirectly). Some recent attempts at 
capturing the impacts of shocks have been presented in the paper, but more work is required, 
especially in complex, open economies where markets can both transfer and amplify the 
  42consequences of shocks or smoothen them out. The second gap relates to the relationship 
between technology, geography, relative prices and long-term patterns of growth to understand 
how and when lock-ins materialize. To do so, it is necessary to understand how increasing returns 
at the micro or sectoral scale do affect the growth rate of aggregate output at the macro scale. 
Regarding the empirical literature on economic growth, we have found (as many before us) 
that most of the empirical studies on economic growth rely on ad hoc models that are not fully 
grounded in theory, thus making it difficult to decide which model is more relevant, and which 
variable is more important. Secondly, we find that there is not yet an empirical literature on the 
effects of the components of the climate change bill on economic growth, probably because 
concerns about climate change are relatively recent and because the necessary data for empirical 
modeling are unavailable—not to mention the lack of a solid foundation to attribute effects. 
Paradoxically, it is the consequences of early action for growth, both mitigation and anticipative 
adaptation, that have been less studied, whereas there exists a sizeable empirical literature on 
climatic shocks. However, recent development of large-scale mitigation policies in such places as 
the EU or some developing countries (through the clean development mechanism) might yield 
data in the near future. 
(6) Because they are usually grounded on the simplest growth models, currently available 
numerical models that assess climate policies provide limited insights on the effects of the 
components of the climate change bill on economic growth, and thus on the optimal portfolio 
of policy actions. In fact, few climate change models analyze the consequences of individual 
components of the climate bill for economic growth, and no model to our knowledge take them 
all into account (see e.g., Table 3). Those that do analyze implications for growth usually frame 
the discussion within a Cass-Koopmans framework or within a multi-sector version of the 
neoclassical growth framework. As discussed in Sections 3 to 5, the neoclassical growth model 
lacks key features of real-world growth dynamics—limitations that automatically translate to 
numerical models based on the neoclassical growth model, and lead to overstating the costs of 
early action in terms of the impact on growth or welfare. 
(7) However, the review also suggests that there is already sufficient material in the 
growth literature to improve the numerical models significantly, notably by including multi-
sectoral approaches, induced technological change and possibly shocks in the next generation of 
numerical growth models, albeit crudely. On the other hand, as noted above, there is still limited 
  43theoretical and empirical understanding of lock-ins—so for that reason it may be more difficult to 
incorporate lock-ins into numerical models immediately. But this is likely to be a priority area for 
future work.  
(8) Finally, this review is not aimed at providing policy recommendations at this stage, in part 
because of the need for more work in theoretical models to incorporate missing features, and the 
need for specific numerical simulations for different types of cases. Despite that, the review does 
provide some insights on how case studies aimed at evaluating the implications of the 
components of the climate change bill for economic growth in a particular country context 
should be conducted.  
•  First, the review reinforces the idea that climate damage assessments should not be 
limited to energy and/or climate sensitive sectors because of indirect interactions 
between these sectors and those non energy sectors that are also not climate sensitive 
directly.  
•  Second, the review suggests that particular attention should be paid to shocks, 
transitions, and geography. Costing shocks correctly increases the total climate bill 
relative to a case where shocks are not properly taken into account. It also increases the 
relative benefits of anticipative adaptation/mitigation since the efforts they demand are 
not as concentrated in time as those required by coping with shocks ex post.  
•  Finally, the risk of ‘bad’ lock-ins versus the opportunities for ‘good’ lock-ins should be 
analyzed carefully. 
To provide better insights on the optimal policy mix between mitigation, proactive adaptation, 
reactive adaptation (and thus remaining ultimate damages), and to justify more rigorously the 
ranking of scenarios 1 to 4 that is implicit in Figure 1 (see also Table 1), future work should 
concentrate on numerical simulations using an extended numerical model of climate change that 
includes all four components of the climate bill within a framework where rigidities and 
increasing returns are taken into account.  
 
  44References 
Adger, Neil, et al. 2007. Working Group II Contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change Fourth Assessment Report. Climate Change 2007: Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability. Summary for Policymakers. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Geneva. 
Aghion, Philippe and Peter Howitt. 1992. Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction. Econometrica 
60(2): 323-351. 
Aron, Janine. 2000. Growth and Institutions: a Review of the Evidence. The World Bank Research 
Observer 15(1): 99-135. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1962. The economic implications of learning by doing. Review of Economic Studies 29: 
155-173. 
Arthur, W. Brian. 1989. Competing technologies, increasing returns and lock-in by historical trends. 
Economic Journal 99(1): 116-131. 
Azariadis, Costas and John Stachurski. 2004. Poverty Traps. Research Paper 913. University of 
Melbourne. 
Barker, Terry et al., 2007. Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change. Working Group III 
contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Fourth Assessment Report Summary 
for Policymakers. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Geneva. 
Barro, Robert and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 2003. Economic Growth (second edition). The MIT Press: 
Cambridge. 
Brecher, Richard A., Zhiqi Chen and Ehsan U. Choudhri. 2005. Dynamic stability in a two-country model 
of optimal growth and international trade. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 29: 583–594. 
Burgess, Robin and Anthony J. Venables. 2004. Towards a microeconomic of growth. In: Bourguignon 
François and Boris Pleskovic (Eds.). Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 
2004: Accelerating Development (Bangalore conference proceedings). World Bank: Washington DC.  
Cass, David. 1965. Optimum Growth in an Aggregative Model of Capital Accumulation. Review of 
Economic Studies 32: 233-240. 
Collier, Paul and Jan Dehn. 2001. Aid, Shocks, and Growth. Policy Research Working Paper 2688. World 
Bank: Washington DC. 
Cowan, Robin. 1990. Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-in. The Journal of 
Economic History 50(3): 541-567. 
Crassous, Renaud, Jean-Charles Hourcade, Olivier Sassi, Vincent Gitz, Sandrine Mathy and Meriem 
Hamdi-Cherif. 2006. IMACLIM-R: A modeling framework for sustainable development issues. 
Working Paper. CIRED: Nogent sur Marne. 
Easterly, William and Ross Levine. 2001. What have we learned from a decade of empirical research on 
growth? It’s Not Factor Accumulation: Stylized Facts and Growth Models. World Bank Economic 
Review 15(2): 177-219. 
Easterly, William, Michael Kremer, Lant Pritchett, and Lawrence Summers. 1993. Good Policy or Good 
Luck? Country Growth Performance and Temporary Shocks. Journal of Monetary Economics 32:459-
483. 
Fankhauser, Samuel and Richard S. J. Tol. 2005. On climate change and economic growth. Resource and 
Energy Economics 27: 1-17. 
  45Fischer, Carolyn, and Richard Morgenstern. 2006. Carbon abatement costs: Why the wide range of 
estimates? The Energy Journal 27(2): 73-86. 
Fujita, M., Paul Krugman, and Anthony Venables, 1999. The Spatial Economy. MIT press: Cambridge. 
Gale, David. 1967. On Optimal Development in a Multi-Sector Economy. The Review of Economic 
Studies 34(1): 1-18. 
Ghersi, Frédéric and Jean-Charles Hourcade. 2006. Macroeconomic Consistency Issues in E3 Modeling: 
The Continued Fable of the Elephant and the Rabbit. The Energy Journal. Special Issue: Hybrid 
Modeling: New Answers to Old Challenges: 27-49. 
Goulder, Lawrence H. and Steven H. Schneider. 1999. Induced technological change and the 
attractiveness of CO2 abatement policies. Resource and Energy Economics 21: 211-253.  
Grubb, Michael, Carlo Carraro and John Schellnhuber (Eds.). 2006. Endogenous Technical Change. A 
Special Issue of The Energy Journal. 
Grubler Arnulf, Nebosja Nakicenovic. and David G. Victor. 1999. Dynamics of energy technologies and 
global change. Energy Policy 27(5):247-280. 
Guesnerie, Roger. 2004. Calcul économique et développement durable. Revue Economique 55(3): 363-
382. 
Hallegatte, Stéphane, Jean-Charles Hourcade and Patrice Dumas. 2007. Why economic dynamics matter 
in assessing climate change damages: Illustration on extreme events. Ecological Economics 62(2): 330-
340. 
Hourcade, Jean-Charles and Maria Kostopoulou. 1994. Quelles politiques face aux chocs énergétiques. 
France, Italie, Japon, RFA : quatre modes de résorption des déséquilibres. Futuribles 189: 7-27. 
Hourcade, Jean-Charles. 2003. Dans le labyrinthe de verre. La négociation sur l’effet de serre. Critique 
Internationale No.15(April): 143-159. 
Hudson, Edward A. and Dale W. Jorgenson. 1974. U. S. Energy Policy and Economic Growth, 1975-
2000. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5(2): 461-514. 
IEA (International Energy Agency). 2004. CO2 emissions from fuel combustion 1971-2002. OECD: Paris.  
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2003. Fund Assistance for Countries Facing Exogenous Shocks. 
Policy Development and Review Departments. IMF: Washington DC. 
King, Robert G. and Sergio T. Rebelo. 1993. Transitional Dynamics and Economic Growth in the 
Neoclassical Model. American Economic Review 83(4): 908-931. 
Koopmans, Tjalling C. 1965. On the Concept of Optimal Economic Growth. Pontificae Academiae 
Scientiarum Scripta Varia 28: 225-300. 
Kraay, A., and C. Raddatz, 2007. Poverty traps, aid, and growth. Journal of Development Economics 82: 
315-347 
Krugman, Paul. 1995. Development, Geography, and Economic Theory. MIT press: Cambridge, MA.  
Laplante, Benoit, Craig Meisner and Hua Wang. 2005. Environment as cultural heritage: the Armenian 
diaspora's willingness-to-pay to protect Armenia's Lake Sevan. World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 3520. World Bank: Washington DC. 
Lecocq, Franck and Zmarak Shalizi. 2007. Balancing Expenditures on Mitigation of and Adaptation to 
Climate Change – an exploration of issues relevant to Developing Countries. Mimeo. 
  46Lecocq, Franck. 2000. Distribution spatiale et temporelle des coûts de politiques publiques sous 
incertitudes : théorie et pratique dans le cas de l’effet de serre. PhD dissertation. ENGREF: Paris. 
Levine, Ross and David Renelt. 1992. A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions. The 
American Economic Review 82(4): 942-963. 
Loyaza, Norman and Raymundo Soto, 2002. Sources of Economic Gowth: An Overview. In Economic 
Growth: Sources, Trends, and Cycles, Central Bank of Chile, Santiago, Chile. 
Lucas, Robert E. 1988. On the mechanics of economic development. Journal of Monetary Economics 
22:3-42. 
Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer and David Weil. 1992. A contribution to the Empirics of Economic 
Growth. Quarterly. Journal of Economics 107(2): 407-437. 
Manne, Alan and Richard Richels. 1992. Buying greenhouse insurance: the economic costs of carbon 
dioxide emission limits. MIT Press: Cambridge. 
Markandya, Anil et al. 2001. Costing Methodologies. In: Metz, Bert, Ogunlade Davidson, Rob Swart and 
Jiahua Pan (Eds.) Climate Change 2001: Mitigation. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: 
Geneva. pp.451-498. 
Martin, Matthew and Hannah Bargawi. 2004. Protecting Africa Against “Shocks”. Africa Commission 
Background Paper. Development Finance International (16 September). 
Matsuoka Yuzuru, Mikiko Kainuma and Tsuneyuki Morita. 1995. Scenario analysis of global warming 
using the Asian Pacific Integrated Model. Energy Policy 23(4/5): 357-371. 
McKibbin, Warwick J. and Peter J. Wilcoxen. 1999. The theoretical and empirical structure of the G-
Cubed model. Economic Modelling 16: 123-148. 
Mohr, Ernst. 1995. Greenhouse Policy persuasion: towards a positive theory of discounting the climate 
future. Ecological Economics 15(3): 235-245. 
Neumayer, Eric. 1999. Global warming: discounting is not the issue, but substitutability is. Energy Policy 
27: 33-43. 
Nordhaus, William D. 1993. Optimal Greenhouse-Gas Reductions and Tax Policy in the “DICE” Model. 
American Economic Review 83(2): 313-317. 
Nordhaus, William D. 2001. After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global Warming. Joint 
session of the American Economic Association and the Association of Environmental and Resource 
Economists. Atlanta, Georgia (January 4). 
Nordhaus, William D. and Zili Yang. 1996. A regional dynamic general-equilibrium model of alternative 
climate-change strategies. American Economic Review 86(4), 741-765. 
O’Connell, Stephen A. and Benno J. Ndulu. 2000. Africa’s growth experience: A focus on the sources of 
growth. AERC. Explaining African Economic Growth Project, April.  
Paltsev, Sergey, John M. Reilly, Henry D. Jacoby, Richard S. Eckaus, James McFarland, Marcus Sarofim, 
Malcolm Asadoorian and Mustafa Babiker. 2005. The MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis 
(EPPA) Model: Version 4. MIT Global Change Joint Program Report 125. MIT: Cambridge. 
Popp, David. 2004. ENTICE: endogenous technological change in the DICE model of global warming. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 48: 742-768. 
Ramsey, F. 1928. A Mathematical Theory of Saving. Economic Journal 38(December): 543-559. 
Rodrick, Dani. 1999. Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, and Growth 
Collapses. Journal of Economic Growth 4: 385-412. 
  47Romer, Paul M. 1990. Endogenous technical change. Journal of Political Economy 98(5): 71-102. 
Ryder, Harl E. 1969. Optimal Accumulation in a Two-Sector Neoclassical Economy with Non-Shiftable 
Capital. Journal of Political Economy 77(4): 665-683. 
Shalizi, Zmarak. 2007. Energy and emissions : local and global effects of the rise of China and India. 
Policy Research Working Paper 4209. World Bank: Washington DC. 
Scheinkman, José A. 1976. On Optimal Steady States of n-Sector Growth Models when Utility is 
Discounted. Journal of Economic Theory 12:11-30. 
Shelby, Michael, Allen A. Fawcett, Eric Smith, Donald A. Hanson and Ronald D. Sands. 2006. 
Representing Technology in CGE Models: A Comparison of SGM and AMIGA for Electricity Sector 
CO2 Mitigation. International Energy Workshop XXV. ERC, EMF, IEA, IIASA. Capetown, 27-29 
June. 
Sobel, Russell S. and Peter T. Leeson. 2006. Government’s response to Hurricane Katrina: A public 
choice analysis. Public Choice 127: 55-73. 
Solow, Robert M. 1956. A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 70(1): 65-94. 
Swan, Trevor W. 1956. Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation. Economic Record: 32(2): 334-361. 
Temple, Jonathan. 1999. The New Growth Evidence. Journal of Economic Literature 37(1): 112-156. 
Thompson, Peter and Timothy G. Taylor. 1995. The Capital-Energy Substitutability Debate: A New Look. 
The Review of Economics and Statistics 77(3): 565-569. 
UNDP (United Nations Development Program), 2006. Survivors of the tsunami: one year later. UNDP: 
New York. 
Uzawa, Hirofumi. 1961. On a Two-Sector Model of Economic Growth I. Review of Economic Studies 29: 
40-47. 
Uzawa, Hirofumi. 1963. On a Two-Sector Model of Economic Growth II. Review of Economic Studies 
30:105-118. 
Uzawa, Hirofumi. 1964. Optimal Growth in a Two-Sector Model of Capital Accumulation. Review of 
Economic Studies 31:1-24. 
World Bank. 2003. Sustainable Development in a dynamic World. World Bank: Washington DC. 
Zagha, Roberto, Gobind Nankani and Indermit Gill. 2006. Rethinking growth. Finance and Development 
43(1) 
  48  49
()
Coefficient α in the Cobb-Douglas production function is typically estimated between 0.3 and 
0.4, whereas typical savings rates s are below 0.2 - 0.25, except in fast-growing developing 
countries where they may reach values above 0.3. The derivative of c with regard to α is thus 
positive in most cases.  
Appendix 1 : Variation of steady-state consumption per capita with α and δ in the Cass-
Koopmans model 
As per the discussion above, the derivative of c with regard to δ is thus negative in most cases.  
The derivative of c with regard to δ is thus: 
  
  







































The derivative of c with regard to α is thus: 
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